Arnan "Sini" Azaryahu
Arnan 鈥淪ini鈥 Azaryahu was a long-time political insider within the Israeli government, where he served as a trusted aide and confidant to Minister Yisrael Galili, a close ally and advisor to Israeli prime minister Golda Meir. In this interview, Sini recounts a tense meeting held in Meir's office during the height of the 1973 Yom Kippur war, when Meir overruled a request from Defense Minister Moshe Dayan to prepare Israel鈥檚 nuclear arsenal for a demonstration blast.
Biography
Arnan 鈥淪ini鈥 Azaryahu (26 June 1917鈥26 November 2008) was an officer in the general staff of the Palmach, a leader in the Kibbutz Hameuchad movement, and later a senior aide and confidant to Minister Yisrael Galili.
Sini was born in 1917 in Haifa to Sarah and Yosef Azaryahu, teachers and Zionists who were among the founders of Tel Aviv. In 1941, Sini was recruited by the Palmach, a Mandate-era Jewish fighting force. He was cultural and education officer just two years later, a position that he held until the Palmach鈥檚 dissolution in 1949. Sini also served as Galili鈥檚 adjutant officer while he was head of the national headquarters of the Haganah, a Jewish defense organization during the British Mandate that became the backbone of the Israeli Defense Force after independence. He held the same position under General Yigal Allon along the southern front of the War of 1948. After independence, Sini joined the secretariat of the Hakibbutz Hameuchad, a part of the Kibbutz Movement associated with the Achdut Ha鈥橝vodah party. He became an envoy to the United States in this capacity in the late 1950s.
Though Sini was not a member of the narrow group around Prime Minister Ben Gurion that had given birth to the nuclear project, his close relationship with many top Israeli security officials, especially Munya Mardor and Galili, gave him an inside look at some key junctions in Israel鈥檚 nuclear history. In 1962 Sini prepared a memo for Galili for the first closed-door Israeli top-level strategic conference on the nuclear program that Ben Gurion conducted. The compromise policy that Ben Gurion ultimately adopted in the wake of that conference may have planted the seeds of Israel鈥檚 nuclear opacity policy. Sini also often discussed nuclear issues in meetings with officials, such as his conversations with Munya Mardor, the director of RAFAEL, after the Six-Day War and with Galili before and after the Yom Kippur War of 1973.
After the Likud party gained power in 1977, Sini left his role in the government. Two years later, he founded the Galilee Center in Yad Tabenkin, which focused on security issues. Sini passed away in November 2008.
Interview Notes
This interview with Arnan Azaryahu (鈥淪ini鈥) was conducted in January 2008 at his apartment in Kibbutz Yiron, in Israel鈥檚 upper Galilee on the Israeli-Lebanese border. Throughout the interview, Sini spoke perfect Hebrew in a deep, melodious voice. The interview took place about ten months prior to Sini鈥檚 passing (November 2008), at the age of 92. By that time, Sini looked frail鈥攈e had a slightly stooped posture, was heavy, and had difficulty in walking鈥攂ut his mind and voice were in full command. He was focused, precise, and quick to respond.
The entire interview spans nearly six hours. It covers numerous historical episodes, encounters, and events of which Sini had the privilege to witness from the inside. While Sini was never a policy maker himself, he often found himself witnessing decisions of national significance. He was the trusted aide and confidant to Minister Yisrael Galili, the leader of the Achdut Ha鈥檃voda party, and a close political ally and advisor to three prime ministers鈥擫evi Eshkol (1963鈥69), Golda Meir (1969鈥74) and Yitzhak Rabin (during his first term, 1974鈥77). During the Meir鈥檚 era, Galili was privy to the same intelligence and military reports as the prime minister, and Sini read them for Galili, often writing memos on his behalf. Above all, Sini鈥檚 interest and knowledge in nuclear affairs made him Galili鈥檚 alter ego on these matters. As a result, Sini witnessed some extraordinary moments in Israel鈥檚 nuclear history.
None of what Sini told me during that interview was new to me. I had heard it all from him before and sometimes more than once. But since I knew that Sini had never written down those tales鈥擲ini had little patience to put his own memoirs in writing鈥擨 felt that his testimony must be saved for the sake of history. When I arrived in Israel in January 2008 and learned that Sini鈥檚 physical health had deteriorated, I hired a videographer and rushed to his home in order to preserve his memories. Sini understood my interest and agreed to cooperate. My purpose on that day was simple: to record those extraordinary testimonies that I otherwise feared would be lost forever. I knew that on those nuclear related incidents Sini might have been the last surviving individual who had witnessed that history in its making.[1]
In particular, I was interested in saving Sini鈥檚 testimony on two key historical events. Both episodes involve fateful moments in Israel鈥檚 nuclear history that have otherwise left almost no trace in the public record, either in documents or in other oral testimonies. This particular 12-minute interview segment concerns one such episode. It involves the story of the small ministerial consultation that took place in Prime Minister Golda Meir鈥檚 office on the early afternoon of the second day of the 1973 Yom Kippur War. 7 October was arguably the most difficult day of the war, when Defense Minister Moshe Dayan proposed to the prime minister and her close advisors that Israel begin preparing its nuclear weapons for a demonstration blast. The episode has received passing mention in a few academic works, including my own The Worst-Kept Secret: Israel鈥檚 Bargain with the Bomb. Yet the event has never been properly chronicled, and鈥攎ore significantly鈥攊t has never been incorporated into the broader narrative of the 1973 war.[2] The full details of that episode have yet to be told.
This interview is unique in the sense that it is the first public testimony made by a credible and identifiable source regarding the deliberations of the Israeli war cabinet on the nuclear issue during the 1973 war.
The Historical Significance of the Interview
This interview has a great deal of historical significance. It negates and essentially refutes the nearly four-decade old 鈥渕ythology鈥 alleging that Israel 鈥渁lmost鈥 reached the nuclear brink during the 1973 war. According to this widespread belief, Israel assembled its nuclear weapons and placed them on highest alert during the early phase of the war when some Israeli leaders panicked and feared that Israel was fast approaching a point of existential danger. Moreover, Israel supposedly used the alert as a form of strategic signaling vis-脿-vis the United States to force it to provide Israel with a massive amount of military supplies. This mythology, though never backed up by direct evidence, is now considered by many as fundamentally true.
Time magazine was the first mainstream publication to make these claims. In an April 1976 story, less than three years after the war, Time asserted that Prime Minister Golda Meir ordered the assembly and arming of Israel鈥檚 doomsday arsenal, a dozen or so nuclear weapons, in approval of a request made by Minister of Defense Moshe Dayan.[3] In 1991, author Seymour Hersh provided further details and extra drama to that general mythology. In his account, the nuclear issue dominated Golda Meir鈥檚 war cabinet meeting on the late morning of October 9. In that meeting, following a briefing by the nation鈥檚 nuclear chief Shalheveth Freier, the forum decided 鈥渢o arm and target the nuclear arsenal鈥 in the event of total collapse鈥濃 and 鈥渢o inform Washington of its unprecedented action,鈥 demanding that Washington initiate an emergency airlift to supply Israel with the arms and ammunition required to continue waging an all-out war effort.鈥 In essence, Hersh describes a situation wherein Israel used its alert as 鈥渘uclear blackmail.鈥[4] Over the years, many other authors have referred to this alleged Israeli 1973 nuclear alert as factual.[5]
Sini鈥檚 testimony questions, even defies, almost all the factual aspects of this common belief. It presents a very different narrative of the nuclear dimension of that war, one of nuclear restraint. It reveals that even during the darkest hours of the 1973 war, when Israel鈥檚 hold on the Golan Heights appeared to be slipping away, the Israeli national leadership, and most significantly Prime Minister Golda Meir, did not panic and were not willing to consider even a modest proposal to take action and prepare the nation鈥檚 doomsday weapons for a possible demonstration.
Sini鈥檚 Testimony: A Close Analysis
Sini鈥檚 testimony is important for what it reveals, but it is by no means exhaustive or comprehensive. While both important and dramatic, the interview provides a snapshot of only one particular encounter. We do not know what preceded it or what followed, nor do we know about decisions and activities that took place at other, lower-level but nuclear-relevant junctions. Sini鈥檚 testimony leaves us with many open questions.
In the following sections, I try to analyze four aspects of this encounter鈥攖he context (general and nuclear), the proposal itself and the human dynamics鈥攚ith an effort to delineate between the known and the unknown. Inevitably, such a discussion is inherently interpretative and, to some extent, speculative.
- The Meeting鈥檚 General Context.
Since originally publishing Sini鈥檚 testimony, I gained access to the original minutes of the ministerial meeting preceding Sini鈥檚 testimony which were formally declassified and released in 2010 by the Israel State Archive. These minutes provide an accurate background for the encounter that Sini described.[6] As expected, the encounter that Sini describes is not included. One can safely surmise that neither Dayan, nor the other ministers would have dared to discuss the nuclear issue while the minutes were being recorded.
The background of the meeting, particularly 顿补测补苍鈥檚 state of mind, is the key to understanding his nuclear proposal. On the previous morning, Moshe Dayan, Israel鈥檚 鈥淢r. Security鈥 and hero of the 1967 Six-Day War had been so confident of Israel鈥檚 ability to defend itself that he opposed mobilizing the entirety of the nation鈥檚 reserve force, despite intelligence reports indicating an imminent Arab military assault. Only a day later, Dayan had been transformed into a different man. After visiting the front lines, Dayan returned to Tel Aviv in the early afternoon as a prophet of doom. In a number of well-documented episodes, Dayan murmured about the demise of the 鈥淭hird Temple,鈥 a reference to the modern state of Israel. Dayan believed that Israel was fighting for its very survival.
With this state of mind, Dayan entered the conference room at the prime minister鈥檚 office, where Meir was anxiously waiting for his assessment of the military situation. According to the official minutes, ten people attended the meeting: Golda Meir, the senior ministers constituting Meir鈥檚 war cabinet (Dayan, Allon, and Galili), and six other senior staff and personal aides. Contrary to Sini鈥檚 testimony, Chief of Staff General David Elazar was not present when the meeting started; he joined towards the end.
The meeting began at 2:50 PM as Dayan started with his assessment of the military situation (noting that his assessment agreed with that of General Elazar). Dayan began by asserting that Israel had lost its lines on both frontiers. Furthermore, Dayan stated that Israel could not hold its few isolated posts along the canal and it must cut its losses by retreating to new defensive lines on the Golan and in the Sinai. 鈥淭hose posts that we can evacuate, we should evacuate; those who we cannot evacuate, they will stay, even surrender. We should tell them: we cannot reach you out; try to break out [to us] or surrender.鈥
In addition, Dayan made it clear that he believed that Jordan would soon join the battle against Israel. He saw the situation as an all-out war: the invading Arabs forces would not stop. 鈥淭he fight is over the entire land of Israel. Even if we withdraw from the Golan Heights, this would not solve anything.鈥 There were already hundreds of casualties and he expected many more. He referred to his bleak assessment as 鈥渕y honest view,鈥 noting that the Northern commander was even more pessimistic than he was.
The discussion that follows 顿补测补苍鈥檚 presentation reflects the thickness of the fog of war at that time. Neither Dayan, nor anyone else in the room understood the situation beyond knowing that it was national nightmare. Prime Minister Meir said at one point, 鈥渢here is no reason why they [the Arabs] would stop . . . they already tasted blood,鈥 and Dayan continued her thought, stating that the arab forces intended 鈥渢o conquer Israel, to eliminate the Jews.鈥 Minister Allon continued the conversation, stating that 鈥淢oshe is right. In this situation there is no other way.鈥
When Prime Minister Meir reminded the forum that the full government was about to convene for a formal session in less than in an hour, Ministers Galili and Dayan proposed to postpone the full government meeting to 9 PM. Prime Minister Meir quickly adopted their suggestion and announced that until then they will continue with informal consultation. At that point the formal meeting ends and the forum was adjourned.
At this point (around 4:20PM) the formal meeting adjourns and the minutes end. Chief of Staff Elazar and non-essential staff left the room, leaving the prime minister and her three senior aides. Here we must turn to Sini鈥檚 testimony, as Dayan makes his nuclear proposal while standing by the exit door after the minutes were no longer being recorded.
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The Nuclear Context
Galili鈥檚 first words to Sini after the meeting adjourned, 鈥渟omething like that never happened to me before,鈥 reveal how extraordinary that encounter was鈥攊t was unprecedented and remarkable. Never before were Israeli leaders asked to activate the nation鈥檚 nuclear weapons for a possible demonstration. Never before had the minister of defense believed that Israel was fast approaching an apocalyptic moment. Never before had the mental state of a leader played such a close role in assessing the rationality of the proposal itself.
One could assume that Golda Meir, being ex-officio in charge of the nuclear agency, had already been in touch with Shalheveth Freier, her nuclear chief, on key issues requiring her approval or knowledge after the war had broken out the day before. For example, the prime minister must have approved the decision to shut down the country鈥檚 nuclear reactors.[7] Additionally, the prime minister had likely received some kind of a status report in written or oral form on the readiness of the nation鈥檚 nuclear inventory.[8] But the afternoon of the 7th was likely the first time that Freier was summoned to the war forum with the expectation that he would receive Meir鈥檚 approval to 顿补测补苍鈥檚 request, and would possibly brief the prime minister and her senior consultants on the operational aspects of the proposal.
Sini鈥檚 testimony reflects a certain ambiguity and lack of knowledge about the process. While it is clear that the proposal was 顿补测补苍鈥檚 idea, and that he arranged for Freier鈥檚 attendance, many other procedural issues about the meeting remain unclear. What was the exact purpose of Freier鈥檚 summoning? Who formally invited Freier to attend the meeting, given the fact that Dayan had returned from the Sinai just minutes earlier? In any case, it is implausible that Dayan could or would have summoned Freier on his own without approval or consultation with Meir.
Furthermore, it remains unclear when and how Meir first learned about 顿补测补苍鈥檚 nuclear ideas, what her initial reaction to his proposal was, and whether Meir personally asked Freier to attend the meeting.[9] It is also unknown what kind of communication, if any, took place between Freier and Dayan (and/or their respective offices) prior to the meeting.
As Sini suggests, Meir had probably been aware of 顿补测补苍鈥檚 thinking, perhaps from meeting face to face just prior to the formal meeting. Yet her original reaction to his nuclear proposal is unclear. It seems that she could have approved the proposal on her own authority鈥攊t appears as though she had the authority to do so鈥攂ut she did not want to, and instead left 顿补测补苍鈥檚 request to the ministerial forum. Was the role of the forum merely consultative, with the ultimate decision lying with the prime minister? Alternatively, one would think that Meir could have endorsed Minister of Defense 顿补测补苍鈥檚 proposal and presented it as her own request鈥攖his would have made a huge difference to the members of the war cabinet鈥攂ut apparently Meir did not endorse 顿补测补苍鈥檚 proposal, and left it to him to present it as his own idea. Indeed, it is not clear from the testimony whether Dayan asked only for the prime minister鈥檚 approval or whether he actually asked for the forum鈥檚 approval.
Furthermore, we know almost nothing about how the Israeli nuclear command and control system worked in 1973, if indeed Israel had any rigid formal procedures. It is unclear to what extent decision-making on the nuclear question was covered by well-defined procedures that articulated the division of labor and authority among the prime minister, the minister of defense and the cabinet. Sini does make a brief reference in his testimony to a 鈥渄ouble key system,鈥 a command and control system requiring approval from both the minister of defense and the prime minister in order to activate nuclear weapons. In any case, we have neither factual nor procedural clarity on any of these issues.
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Assessing 顿补测补苍鈥檚 Proposal
There are also many nagging questions鈥攂ig and small鈥攊nvolving the specifics of 顿补测补苍鈥檚 proposal and its underlying technical and strategic context. Analytically, one could divide those questions into two groups: first, the specifics of 顿补测补苍鈥檚 proposal: what exactly he proposed to do; and second, the state of Israel鈥檚 actual nuclear capabilities, that is, the capabilities required to make 顿补测补苍鈥檚 proposal feasible.
On the former subject, all that we know from Sini鈥檚 testimony is that Dayan proposed that Meir would order Shalheveth Freier, the nation鈥檚 nuclear chief, to initiate 鈥減reparations鈥 towards a 鈥渘uclear demonstration鈥濃攅xplicitly a demonstration, not a use against any targets鈥攖o save precious time (鈥渉alf a day鈥) should the need become imminent and necessary. Beyond this, we know nothing; all else is mere speculation.
Still, it is interesting to consider what a 鈥渘uclear demonstration鈥 might have involved and whether the suggested timeframe of 6鈥12 hours was realistic. Israel was presumably capable of conducting an underground detonation of a weapon with a yield on the order of Hiroshima or Nagasaki (~20kt). However, even with a pre-drilled testing facility, the setup time required would have probably exceeded the half-day timeframe, without even considering the political uncertainties involved in conducting an underground test in time of war. Moreover, even if an underground demonstration could have been carried out, there would be serious doubts about its effectiveness on the Egyptian and Syrian governments and little to no indication that it would have applied sufficient pressure to cause a cessation of hostilities. Such a demonstration makes very little strategic, logistic or political sense.
A far more effective demonstration within Israel鈥檚 technical capabilities and the suggested timeframe would have been one or more high altitude bursts over unpopulated areas of Syria, Egypt or both. Such blasts would be conducted at a time (probably shortly after dark) to make the demonstration visible in the capital cities of Cairo and Damascus, thereby avoiding any debates that might have been associated with an underground demonstration and ensuring extreme public pressure on the Syrian and Egyptian governments.
Furthermore, it is highly likely that the Israeli Air Force (IAF) had a small group of pilots pre-trained on nuclear missions in French Mirage aircraft (used to avoid conflict with the commitment Israel had given that its US-supplied aircraft were not to be used for nuclear weapons missions) and the necessary adaption kits for nuclear payloads ready to install very quickly. The IAF presumably would have been able to rapidly move weapons, configure the Mirage aircraft for nuclear strike missions, assemble pilots pre-qualified for nuclear missions, organize escorts, and brief and launch such demonstration missions within 6 to 12 hours.[10]
Given the situation, one can safely suggest that 顿补测补苍鈥檚 idea was probably to prepare logistically and organizationally for a high altitude aerial burst over a desolate area. It would require the IAF and the Israel Atomic Energy Commission working closely with one another to assemble a handful of weapons for the demonstration. Presumably, all those issues should have been explained to the forum in Freier鈥檚 briefing, but that presentation was never authorized, and was consequently never delivered. 顿补测补苍鈥檚 proposal was killed before it even had a chance to be discussed.
In the final analysis, 顿补测补苍鈥檚 nuclear idea was a declaration of despair. Had Israel conducted a nuclear demonstration in the middle of the war, would it have been understood by all as an anguished decision of last resort? Although it could be argued that such a demonstration strategy might have forced Egypt and Syria to pause hostilities, Israel would have been seen as weak and effectively defeated by resorting to the use of nuclear weapons. Would it have been in the Israeli interest to convey such message? Could a military situation be envisioned where such a move would make sense? Furthermore, such a demonstration would have unleashed an immediate nuclear arms race in the region, in addition to the inevitable near term international condemnation and demands for Israeli disarmament.
While we do not know what exactly triggered 顿补测补苍鈥檚 nuclear proposal or how much time and thought he put into it, we do know that Dayan was in a state of acute shock by the afternoon of the second day of the war; some even describe it as near breakdown.[11] It is evident that his nuclear proposal reflects a gloom and doom state of mind.
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The Human Drama
Sini described the encounter in a calm, semi-factual tone, but the meeting was surely full of drama. Some of the tension surrounded the extraordinary and unprecedented nature of the situation itself. But the drama also had a strong human dimension: there was a great deal of bad blood within the group鈥攔ivalries, lack of trust, even contempt. While two of the principals were close allies鈥擬eir and Galili鈥攖he other two principals, Deputy Prime Minister Yigal Allon and Minister of Defense Moshe Dayan, had been archrivals for decades. The nuclear issue further fueled their rivalry. Since Galili shared much of Allon鈥檚 resentment towards Dayan, and Meir had never been close to Dayan to begin with, the forum was unfriendly to 顿补测补苍鈥檚 nuclear ideas.
As suggested earlier, it is likely that Dayan may have had earlier communication with the prime minister about his request. If so inclined, Meir could have quietly approved the request without bringing it to the attention of the larger forum, on the grounds that the request was technical鈥攐nly to prepare the nuclear weapons, not an order to detonate them. Alternatively, she could have presented the request as a joint proposal鈥攄eveloped by both the prime minister and the minister of defense鈥攂ut it appears that she kept her distance and allowed Dayan to introduce the idea on his own. She chose to involve herself only to the extent that she knew about his plan ahead of time. That may indicate that she already questioned the judgment of Dayan in assessing the war situation. In any case, Dayan had to make his formal request to the ministerial forum on his own.
顿补测补苍鈥檚 modus operandi reflects an attempt to present his request in the least controversial manner. He brought up the suggestion at the end of the meeting, after Israeli Defense Force Chief of Staff David Elazar left the room and minutes were no longer being taken.[12][13] The proposal was presented as a technical matter, a request to take precautionary steps just in case鈥攏ot as a request to take military action. As Sini points out in his testimony, Dayan made deliberate efforts, in both speech and in form, to trivialize and belittle his request.
Not only did Dayan fail to secure the approval of his request, he generated and reinforced the opposite response鈥攖otal rejection. Allon and Galili viewed 顿补测补苍鈥檚 incredible suggestion at the end of the meeting as panicky and deceptive. It demonstrated that Dayan had lost his ability to make sound judgments as a sober military chief and the cabinet saw his proposal as the irrational product of overwhelming panic. Furthermore, the manner in which Dayan presented his proposal to the forum鈥攃asually leaning against the exit door and treating his request to assemble nuclear weapons as a simple precautionary step鈥攚as seen by Galili, Allon, and probably Golda Meir as well, as evidence that the minister of defense had lost his touch and had become a danger. When they flared up with their absolute opposition to 顿补测补苍鈥檚 proposal, they made sure that Meir would instruct him to 鈥渇orget about it.鈥 Galili made special efforts to ensure that the prime minister鈥檚 senior military aide, General Lior, would tell nuclear chief Shalheveth Freier to discard 顿补测补苍鈥檚 proposal.
Final Thoughts
It is important to recognize that Sini鈥檚 testimony, released for the first time on the 40th anniversary of the 1973 Yom Kippur War, is so far the only direct and credible Israeli eyewitness testimony on the nuclear dimension of that war.
One primary reason for the general obscurity of the subject is Israel鈥檚 code of silence on all nuclear matters. Given the culture of secrecy and the institutional censorship in Israel on all nuclear issues, it is not surprising that the nuclear dimension of the war has remained undocumented.
Sini鈥檚 testimony is novel. It contradicts, if not flatly refutes, the narrative of Seymour Hersh鈥檚 1991 book, The Samson Option, and instead offers a much more nuanced and restrained story. It acknowledges that the 1973 war had a nuclear dimension, but that dimension was much more minor and contained than previously believed. Even a 鈥渏ust in case鈥 preparatory proposal was ultimately ruled out by Prime Minister Meir and her trusted political advisors. 顿补测补苍鈥檚 nuclear proposal went nowhere.
Sini鈥檚 testimony reveals that the Israeli leadership, with the notable exception of Minister of Defense Moshe Dayan, recognized the danger of the nuclear brink during the1973 war and refused to approach it. In that meeting, Israel discovered its own commitment to the nuclear taboo.
[1] Many people who knew Sini well realized that he held a treasure trove of historical tales in his mind and that they must be somehow preserved. Ultimately, Ora Armoni interviewed Sini about his life and based on those conversations she wrote Sini鈥檚 biography. The book was published in 2008 shortly before he died. [See, Ora Armony, "Haver v'ish sod: Sichot im Sini" ("Friend and Confidant: Conversations with Sini"), Hakibbutz Hameuchad and Yad Tabenkin, 254 pp, 2008] However, in those interviews Sini did not feel comfortable elaborating on those sensitive episodes in Israel鈥檚 nuclear history. Those issues remain unexplored.
[2] Avner Cohen, The Worst Told Secret: Israel鈥檚 Bargain with the Bomb (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010), xxii, xxxiii, 40, 49-50, 80-81, 177; Yair Evron, Israel鈥檚 Nuclear Dilemma (Great Britain: Cornell University Press, 1994), 71-72.
[3] 鈥淰iolent Week: The Politics of Death,鈥 Time, April 12, 1976.
[4] Seymour M. Hersh, The Samson Option: Israel鈥檚 Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy (New York: Random House, 1991), 225-240.
[5] Richard Sale, 鈥淵om Kippur: Israel鈥檚 1973 Nuclear Alert,鈥 UPI.com, September 16, 2002, available at ; Walter Boyne, The Two O鈥機lock War: The 1973 Yom Kippur Conflict and the Airlift That Saved Israel (New York: Thomas Dunne Books, 2002); Howard Blum, Eve of Destruction: The Untold Story of the Yom Kippur War (New York: Harper Collins, 2003), 227-229.
[6] 鈥淒iscussion at the Prime Minister Office on October 7, 1973, 2:50 PM鈥 Minutes written by Eli Mizrachi.
[7] In a conversation with the author, Israeli military scientist and former politician Yuval Ne鈥檈man suggested that shutting down nuclear reactors would be a standard procedure during war-time. Ne鈥檈man discussed this and other issues related to Israel鈥檚 nuclear weapons and infrastructure during the 1973 War in Michael O. Wheeler and Kemper V. Gay, eds., Nuclear Weapons and the 1973 Middle East War, Center for National Security Negotiations Occasional Paper, August 1996.
[8] Ibid. p. 5; Elbridge Colby, Avner Cohen, William McCants, and Bradley Morris, 鈥淭he Israeli 鈥淣uclear Alert鈥 of 1973: Deterrence and Signaling in Crisis鈥, CNA Analysis and Solutions, April 2013, available at , p. 2.
[9] For the minister of defense to invite the nuclear chief on his own would be against established protocol where the prime minister is the final authority on nuclear matters and the nuclear chief is a direct subordinate to the prime minister. Additionally, it would not fit the authority relationship established between Meir as the prime minister and Dayan as her minister of defense: Dayan may have disagreed with Meir, but he always respected her final authority as the prime minister (as this encounter demonstrates). From Freier鈥檚 perspective, it is also implausible that he would have come to the consultation on 顿补测补苍鈥檚 orders without being invited or at least cleared by the prime minister鈥檚 military aide, General Yisrael Lior.
[10] I am greatly indebted to my colleague and friend Dr. George Moore who has some practical experience in these matters and who was kind enough to brainstorm with me on these issues. Much of what is written in this section is based on that brainstorming when we both tried to respond to the challenge of making sense of 顿补测补苍鈥檚 proposal based on limited factual information and more logical conjectures. I must note that I have heard second hand rumors that some of those joint activities on the ground were actually executed, some rumors even suggest that bombs were rushed to the aircrafts, but I remain agnostic to the veracity of those claims.
[11] Amir Oren, 鈥淵om Kippur War documents darken Dayan's image,鈥 Haaretz, October 5, 2010, available at ; In a television interview, Naphtali Lavie鈥敹俨共獠共遭檚 spokesman at the time of the 1973 War鈥攔ecalled a conversation with Dayan during the darkest hours of the war. After a failed attempt by Israeli forces to cross the Suez Canal, Dayan was alleged to have said, 鈥渢here will probably be no choice but to use the most painful means in order to stop [the Arab forces].鈥 Part of the interview is available here: http://youtu.be/rax-YKer-qE?t=8m18s. The interview begins at 8:18.
[12] Sini pointed out that a prime reason why Dayan raised the issue after the chief of staff, General David Elazar, left the meeting was that he knew that Elazar would oppose the proposal.
[13] Lt. General David 鈥淒ado鈥 Elazar served as Chief of Staff of the Israeli Defense Forces from 1972-1974. Elazar resigned after an official government report blamed him for the military鈥檚 unpreparedness at the outset of the 1973 War.