A blog of the History and Public Policy Program
A new release of documents to the Digital Archive give readers an inside look into Japanese Prime Minsiter Kaifu Toshiki's trip to the Middle East in October 1990. The trip represented an important moment for Kaifu, as he attempted to use the Gulf Crisis to raise Japan's influence on the global stage.
The 1990-1991 Gulf War represented an important juncture for Japan鈥檚 role in the world, following the end of the Cold War.
During the crisis, Japanese Prime Minister Kaifu Toshiki saw an opportunity to expand Japan鈥檚 international influence and visibility on the global stage. dispatching troops from the Japanese Self-Defense Forces (SDF) to join the multinational force against Iraq. While the Japanese Diet blocked this effort, Kaifu tried to assert Japanese influence in other ways.
Kaifu became personally involved in diplomacy with Iraq and other Middle Eastern states following Saddam Hussein鈥檚 invasion of Kuwait. He met with Iraqi First Deputy Minister, Taha Yassin Ramadan, and other heads of state from the region in October 1990, the records of which the Japanese Foreign Ministry recently declassified and published online.
Selected English translations of these meetings, , provide a rare, fly on the wall perspective of Kaifu鈥檚 diplomacy. They also depict in fascinating detail the precarious position that regional leaders in the Middle East found themselves in during the fall of 1990.
Kaifu was originally scheduled to visit the Middle East in August, but postponed his trip following Saddam鈥檚 invasion of Kuwait on August 2. In the weeks that followed, Kaifu was under intense pressure from the United States and other friendly nations for Japan to actively participate in the international effort against Saddam Hussein. While Kaifu announced sanctions against Iraq, in other ways by the Japanese Diet and the Japanese courts.
Kaifu finally managed to reschedule his trip during the first week of October. He visited Egypt, Jordan, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Oman in order to meet with heads of state from each country and demonstrate Japan鈥檚 steadfast response against Iraq and Japan鈥檚 overall engagement with the region. In Jordan, he also sat down briefly with one of Saddam鈥檚 top advisors, Taha Yassin Ramadan, where he asked for Iraq to immediately withdraw from Kuwait.
The records of these meetings reveal the complex web of obligations Kaifu tried to navigate as he sought to appease not just the United States and his own people, but each Middle Eastern leader as well 鈥 while simultaneously promoting his own agenda. Throughout his tour, heads of state and foreign ministers from the Middle East expressed their deep concern over the impact of sanctions and the threat of a wider war following Saddam鈥檚 occupation of Kuwait. For instance, in his conversation with the Crown Prince of Jordan on October 4, the prince highlighted Jordanian fears that military intervention against Iraq would inevitably spiral out of control, leaving his country to suffer the consequences. The Crown Prince explained:
Waging war with Iraq would further militarize the region, including Iran. I cannot even imagine what the scenario would be. In the event that Iraq prepared missiles against Israel, Israel, with satellite intelligence from the United States, would launch a counterstrike. I wonder if this would violate Jordan鈥檚 airspace. There is also reporting that the US military would use Jordanian territory. In short, what is clear is that Jordan would be reduced to scorched earth.
Sultan Qaboos of Oman later in the trip outlined Jordan鈥檚 difficult political position following the invasion. According to the Sultan, 鈥淜ing Hussein has lost the confidence of his Arab brothers. The reason for this is that he has praised Saddam Hussein for being kind, thoughtful, wise, magnanimous, and for having the Arab cause in his heart. King Hussein probably believes this, but it is a mistaken judgement.鈥 Furthermore, the Jordanian people largely sided with Iraq. 鈥淛ordan will survive as a buffer zone between Iraq and Israel,鈥 he elaborated, 鈥渟o long as it seeks to play that role. If Jordan should stop and side with Iraq, and should Iraq鈥檚 influence grow, then domestic extremists will emerge and Jordan鈥檚 role will change.鈥
Other leaders in the region were not so sympathetic to Jordan鈥檚 predicament. Egyptian President, Hosni Mubarak, railed against his 鈥渇ormer friend,鈥 King Hussein of Jordan, for 鈥渨hispering to the Jordanian people鈥 that Egypt was responsible for Jordan鈥檚 difficult economic and political position. 鈥淚 am sorry to tell you such things, Prime Minister,鈥 he confided to Kaifu, 鈥渂ut King Hussein is someone who goes around deceiving people.鈥
Saudi King Fahd, during his October 6 conversation with Kaifu, expressed his own shock at the news of Iraq鈥檚 invasion, having been reassured just weeks before, along with Mubarak, that Saddam had no plans to attack Kuwait. 鈥淲hen I heard information from the military in the east, I was unable to believe it right away. Hearing that Kuwait had come under attack I repeatedly asked them: From where had they com under attack? Was it not Iran? Was it really Iraq?鈥
The records show, with remarkable clarity, the discord among the Arab leaders during the Gulf Crisis. The shock and desperation that some of the regional leaders expressed to Kaifu offer important insights into their mindsets and the chaos Saddam鈥檚 attacks unleashed throughout the Middle East.
Kaifu tried to calm his counterparts with promises of economic assistance to lessen the damage of sanctions, but he was not always fully successful. Indeed, the documents make clear that Kaifu felt pressure coming from all sides. for Japan to join the military coalition, with the Japanese courts and the opposition challenging his requests to utilize the Japanese Self Defense Forces abroad, and with the local Middle East nations desperate to protect themselves should war break out, the opportunity Kaifu sought to leverage likely felt more like a conundrum.
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