乐鱼体育

BY MAXIM TRUDOLYUBOV

In a momentous day for Russia鈥檚 politics, the Russian government resigned January 15 following President Vladimir Putin鈥檚 announcement of an array of changes to the country鈥檚 constitution. If implemented, the proposed redistribution of powers between the branches of government would compare in scale to that of 1993, when the current constitution was adopted.

Effectively, Russia will get a new constitution sometime later this year. The paradox of the proposed change, though, is that it is meant to preserve the status quo, whereby Putin remains Russia鈥檚 paramount leader for the indefinite future.

Mikhail Mishustin, the quiet technocrat who is head of Russia鈥檚 tax service, is going to be Russia鈥檚 next prime minister. Mishustin has been the Federal Tax Service chief since 2010 and has led a thorough digitalization of the ministry, creating an online interface for taxpayers.

Putin proposed giving more powers to Russia鈥檚 parliament and prime minister while bringing the State Council, consisting of the country鈥檚 highest-ranking officials and regional governors, back to prominence. Medvedev鈥檚 resignation was clearly an agreed-upon change as Medvedev made his own announcement while sitting next to Putin. Medvedev will move on to become deputy head of the Security Council, a body that Putin chairs.

Most commentators agree that the purpose of both the cabinet change and the constitutional amendments is to decentralize the system of governance. It is understood that the proposed redistribution of powers is meant to create a senior position for Putin to hold when he leaves the presidency in 2024. In his state of the nation address on Wednesday, during which he announced all the changes, Putin reiterated that he would not be president after 2024, but did not say he will leave government.

Putin鈥檚 announcement came as a bombshell to most observers, but a lot of the changes he proposed remain vague when one tries to unpack them. The amendments seem to be meant to provide Putin with a number of options. The post of president will likely cease to be as important as it is now and, if this is the plan, Putin will be able to become speaker of either chamber of the empowered parliament or head of the newly invigorated State Council, powerful positions under the proposed changes. No one doubts that he intends to remain the dominant figure in Russian politics.

Parallels with what seems to be transpiring in the Kremlin may be found in Soviet history, as well as to the east and south of Russia鈥檚 borders. One important source of Putin鈥檚 statecraft is Stalin鈥檚 art of 鈥渕anaging the party line,鈥� of which the Soviet leader was a true master. Stalin always stayed on top of his henchmen and the general public by surprising everyone with unanticipated policy changes and announcements. But comparing Putin to Stalin has limited value because modern Russia is a highly modernized society with open borders, an educated population, and no real ideology.

China鈥檚 example would be more productive. Deng Xiaoping was China鈥檚 de facto leader between 1977 and the mid-1990s. The only government position Deng held was that of first vice premier of the State Council. He also chaired the Central Military Commission. Deng is widely credited with steering China away from Mao Zedong鈥檚 dogmatic communism and into the ideologically socialist but effectively capitalist system it now has.

Deng did not officially lead China鈥檚 post-Mao political system, he created it. While keeping to ostensibly inconspicuous roles, he supervised the rotation of heads of state and general secretaries of the Communist Party of China. Deng still affected China鈥檚 politics well into his eighties. Putin is only sixty-seven.

Another important waymark for Putin is Lee Kuan Yew, who was Singapore鈥檚 first prime minister and led the country for more than five decades. After stepping down as prime minister in 1990 Lee stayed on as senior minister and later as 鈥渕inister mentor.鈥� Lee was architect and political leader of Singapore鈥檚 transformation from a quiet British colony to a postindustrial high-income economy. Singapore normally scores as one of the world鈥檚 freest economies but holds one of the world鈥檚 lowest positions on lists that monitor freedom of speech and of the press.

鈥淵ou need stability, certainty and security more than anything else,鈥� Lee told this writer in . 鈥淒emocracy does not work in chaos. You know this expression 鈥榣aw and order鈥�? Law does not work when there is no order.鈥� Putin would agree with every word here.

Lee also said that a big-bang transition from a communist system may fuel high-ranking corruption. When asked about Singapore鈥檚 experience in tackling this problem, Lee had this to say: 鈥淢ost importantly, one needs a clean central government. If people at the top cannot serve as models of high moral standards that gradually trickle down to lower levels, affecting change would be very difficult.鈥� Corruption remains one of Russia鈥檚 main political problems, and Putin has consistently resisted creating Singapore-style institutions for fighting political graft.

One more example is Nursultan Nazarbayev, who was president of Kazakhstan until last year. In 2019, Nazarbayev stepped down from the presidency but stayed on as chair of the country鈥檚 Security Council. Like Deng or Lee, Nazarbayev, seventy-nine, clearly intends to continue overseeing the political system he created, reserving for himself the right to handpick presidents and other high officials.

Russia鈥檚 important difference from China or Singapore or Kazakhstan is that Putin鈥檚 policies point in a different direction. Under Putin, many private businesses were nationalized, private property ownership was undermined, and foreign investment nearly stopped. Educating young people abroad or supporting free enterprise at home have never been among Putin鈥檚 priorities.

Putin could be compared to Deng or Lee in the strength of his grip on the Russian political system, but that is where the comparison ends. Putin steered Russia away from the world, revived the country鈥檚 state sector, and made employees paid out of the state budget his political base.

Regardless of what becomes of Russia鈥檚 parliament, it is what happens during the elections that is really important. If the current Russian state鈥檚 tight control over the electoral process continues鈥攁nd there is no indication that it will not鈥攁ny empowerment of any constitutional body will remain of limited meaning to Russian society.

Putin鈥檚 rewrite of the rules will be the subject of endless punditry, it will also create new opportunities for the insiders, but it will upset those who had hopes for a bottom-up political change.

One point of Putin鈥檚 鈥渢op-down revolution鈥� is to prevent any pressure from his high-placed colleagues, possibly even attempts to undermine his power or bring in a less conservative president. This is Stalin鈥檚 art of anticipation. Another point of Putin鈥檚 鈥渞evolution from above鈥� is to prevent a grass-roots one. He clearly saw something brewing and, by initiating a top-down change, now anticipates a different kind of change.